Controlled OT pentest, safety-focused, with live-system protection.
OT Penetration Testing involves simulating targeted cyber-attacks against your industrial control systems to identify weaknesses across hardware, software and processes. We start with non-intrusive scans (vulnerability assessments, network mapping and traffic analysis) then, where safe, execute controlled exploits to demonstrate real impact.
Our offensive-security approach tests the effectiveness of your existing safeguards and reveals gaps that could otherwise be overlooked. Throughout, we prioritize availability to ensure production continuity.
Understand how far attackers can penetrate your OT network
Gauge operational impact of potential breaches
Map likely attack paths against critical assets
Deep technical analysis of your ICS/SCADA security posture
Prioritize high-risk vulnerabilities for remediation
Preserve availability with a carefully scoped test strategy
Set technical and organizational boundaries.
Standards-aligned, OT-specific evaluation.
Executive and technical documentation.
This service is particularly valuable in the sectors below, due to their specific regulations, asset base and threat models.
On an industrial network standard penetration testing methodology is dangerous. Aggressive scanning can knock over a controller; an exploitation attempt can halt production. The emphasis is therefore on verifying segmentation, not on breaking controllers.
We record in writing what is tested, what is off limits, who the contact is, and what triggers an immediate stop. Operations management participation is not optional at this stage.
From traffic mirroring we build the attack surface picture: devices, protocols, communication paths, crossings between IT and OT.
This is the heart of the test: can you really not cross from the office network into the plant? Do the zone boundaries hold? How far can you get through supplier channels?
Where the risk is acceptable we prove the attack chain in a lab or on spare hardware. Where it is not, we outline a theoretical chain with proven preconditions.
The methodology adapts to industrial constraints. Every active step carries a risk assessment and prior approval.
| Area | Method | Risk level |
|---|---|---|
| Device discovery | Passive traffic analysis | None (listening only) |
| IT/OT crossings | Network path analysis from the IT side | Low |
| Zone boundaries | Segmentation verification, testing permitted traffic | Low |
| Remote access | Supplier channels, VPN, jump servers | Low to medium |
| Engineering workstation | Privileges, program download capability | Medium |
| Protocol level | Modbus, S7comm commands in a lab | Lab or downtime only |
| Controller-level exploitation | On spare hardware, by agreement | Only with explicit authorisation |
It is, which is why the methodology differs fundamentally from IT. Reconnaissance is passive; active steps happen only after a prior risk assessment and approval; controller-level exploitation takes place in a lab or during planned downtime on identical spare hardware. There is continuous contact with operations throughout, and the test can be halted at any moment. In many cases outlining the theoretical attack chain supports the same decision as actual execution, at far lower risk.
Primarily whether segmentation works. In most industrial environments the question is not whether a PLC can be broken but whether an attacker reaches it at all. If process control is reachable from the office network via a workstation compromised through phishing, that is the most serious finding on its own, regardless of what vulnerabilities the controller carries.
After the segmentation project, because then there is something to verify. On a still-flat network the result is predictable, and the money is better spent on segmentation. The right order: asset inventory, risk assessment, segmentation, then a penetration test proving the zone boundaries hold. After that, repeat annually and following any major redesign.
The bulk of the test needs none: passive discovery, IT-side examination and segmentation verification require no production break. Downtime is needed only for controller-level active exploitation, and not always even then: spare hardware or a lab environment can substitute. During scope alignment we clarify what runs without downtime and what needs a window.
Scope alignment records the immediate notification path: who is called, on which channel, and what qualifies as requiring immediate escalation. If the tester finds a risk posing direct danger to the process or human safety, the test stops immediately and notification happens without waiting for the report.