Power plants, substations, energy distribution.
"Power generation organisations are prime targets, but a structured, risk-based OT program can drastically cut those risks."
This sector faces growing OT cyber risks.
Compromised OT can disrupt power generation or even physically damage assets (e.g. turbine overspeed).
Regulatory audits (EU NIS2, CISA etc.) require demonstrable, effective OT risk programs or face fines/licenses revocation.
Nation-state actors, cybercriminals and hacktivists increasingly target utilities. Convergence, geographic complexity and low OT maturity expand the attack surface.
Compromised OT can disrupt power generation or even physically damage assets (e.g. turbine overspeed). Regulatory audits (EU NIS2, CISA etc.) require demonstrable, effective OT risk programs or face fines/licenses revocation.
For organisations lacking an OT cyber program, we recommend a two-stage, holistic approach: Stage 1 – Identify & Prioritise Map critical OT functions (generation units, substations), assess impact of outages, and leverage engineers to identify attack paths: covering network diagrams, access controls, supply chain, and physical security. Stage 2 – Build OT Cybersecurity Framework (OT-CSF) Formalise policies, procedures and playbooks aligned with: Minimum scope: Mature with self-assessments, third-party audits, vendor assurance, threat detection, vulnerability monitoring and PAM. Ensure budgets, in-house skills, vendor support and governance mechanisms to sustain your OT program.
Identify critical OT functions and assess the consequences of a cyber attack.
Establish a formal OT-CSF with policies and procedures. Typical elements: Governance model (RACI), End-to-end operating model, Regulatory compliance mapping, Asset inventory, Network architecture docs, Incident response plan.
These services are best suited to address the OT risks in this industry.
Substation automation and remotely supervised sites create a distinctive risk picture: real-time requirements, the IEC 61850 protocol family, and outage consequences that extend beyond the company's boundaries.
Analysing IEC 61850 GOOSE and MMS traffic, identifying IEDs and protection relays. Active scanning is expressly prohibited here because of real-time requirements.
Station level, bay level and process level form separate zones. The remote supervision link is its own tightly controlled conduit.
The link between the control centre and sites is often the weakest element. MFA, encrypted channel, on-demand activation.
What happens if remote supervision fails? Documenting local operability and the restoration sequence.
The energy sector OT environment differs fundamentally in a few respects, and these determine where project emphasis falls.
| Characteristic | Why it matters | Consequence for the project |
|---|---|---|
| Real-time requirement | GOOSE messages tolerate millisecond latency | Active scanning excluded, passive only |
| Distributed sites | Many, often unattended substations | The remote supervision channel is the main risk |
| Long device lifetime | Protection relays run 20-25 years | Compensating controls instead of patching |
| Physical security | Physical substation access is also a vector | Access control and logging brought in scope |
| Outage consequence | Impact extends beyond company boundaries | Higher Security Level justified |
| Sector regulation | Distinct requirements for critical infrastructure | Compliance documentation built in |
No, because we work exclusively passively. This matters particularly in the energy sector: IEC 61850 GOOSE messages tolerate millisecond latency, and load caused by an active scanner is an unacceptable risk even in principle. The TAP used for traffic mirroring is installed in the switch cabinet without touching the protection chain.
The remote supervision link. The channel between control centre and sites was often built years ago on assumptions that no longer hold: internet instead of a dedicated line, without encryption, with single-factor authentication. This is the point where an attacker reaches several sites at once, so it is worth starting there.
Not by patching, which is mostly impossible. Three layers: strict zone boundaries so they are reachable only from where necessary; network-level virtual patching for known vulnerabilities; and continuous monitoring, because these devices communicate extremely predictably, making deviations easy to detect.
Assessment and design do not. Switching segmentation to enforcement needs a short window per zone, fitted to the existing maintenance schedule. With multiple substations we proceed in stages, and experience from the first shortens the rest.