Interactive demo
Protecting an industrial network with the Purdue model
Choose a scenario, switch the protection layers on or off, and see where the attack stops. Network protection (firewall and OT IPS) works at the zone boundaries, endpoint protection (allowlisting) on the OT machines.
Scenarios
What the scenarios show
A short look at what happens in each of the seven scenarios and which protection layer matters in it.
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Normal operation
Measurement data travels from the PLCs through SCADA and the historian to the replica in the DMZ, and the office systems see only that replica. Every direction uses an allowed channel, so there is nothing to stop at the zone boundaries.
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Ransomware from the office
It starts from a phishing e-mail and tries to cross toward OT over SMB. With network protection on, the firewall between IT and the DMZ stops it. Without it, endpoint protection can still keep it from running on the OT machines, but by then the attacker is inside the plant network.
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Infected USB on the engineering workstation
The USB drive gets in through the engineering workstation and bypasses the zone boundaries, so the allowlist is the first line of defense here. If you switch it off, the malware spreads across the L3 and L2 machines, and the OT IPS can at most catch the PLC program download.
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Unauthorized Modbus command
The attacker uses the allowed HMI application with a stolen operator account to send a write command to the PLC. No new malware runs, so endpoint protection has nothing to block. The OT IPS rule in front of the controllers decides, and it allows writes only from the SCADA server.
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Spoofed measurements (AiTM)
An unknown device inserts itself between SCADA and the PLC and shows the operator normal values while the real pressure rises. The OT IPS can catch the command sent to the controller, but only segmentation within the zone, switch port security and network anomaly monitoring remove the deception.
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Stolen VPN account
With a valid account, endpoint protection cannot tell the attacker from the maintenance technician. The login is stopped by the firewall rule and multi-factor authentication on the jump host.
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Infected update from the DMZ
A compromised patch server in the DMZ would push an installer disguised as an update to the OT machines. The industrial firewall lets only the approved update channel through. If that filtering is missing, the allowlist can still keep the installer from running.