Even in a well-segmented OT network, most files still arrive by hand. A maintenance technician brings the modified PLC program on a USB drive, the machine builder's technician plugs their own laptop into the controller, and the quality team carries measurement data out on a USB stick. The stricter the network boundary, the more removable media remain the easiest way in, for malware as well.
This article describes how to turn that route into a controlled gate. We go through what an inspection kiosk at the entrance does, what a portable scanning device is for on machines where nothing can be installed, and what procedure the two need around them. The examples use two TXOne Networks products, the Safe Port kiosk and the Portable Inspector device.
Why USB drives are a risk in the plant
Many people consider a machine that is not connected to a network, or is isolated from it, protected by default. An air gap does rule out network attacks, but program updates, recipes, and service software still reach the machine, only on a USB drive.
The best-known public example is Stuxnet, discovered in 2010. According to the published analyses, it entered an isolated industrial network on USB media and exploited a vulnerability in how Windows handles shortcuts: opening the infected drive's contents in the file manager was enough, with no click needed. The vendor fixed the flaw the same year (MS10-046).
Plant HMIs and engineering workstations often run old versions of Windows, without endpoint protection or regular patching. Why that is, and what protection can still be installed on them, is covered in detail in our article on OT endpoint protection. On these machines, there is often nothing standing between an infected file on a USB drive and its execution.
The device itself can be the attacker
A USB device with modified firmware can present itself to the machine as a keyboard and type in commands. There is no file to scan in that case, so a malware scanner will not catch this risk. The defense against it is the media intake procedure, which defines which devices may connect to plant machines at all.
An inspection kiosk at the entrance
An inspection kiosk is a fixed station at the plant's point of entry, for example at the gatehouse or in the maintenance workshop. Any media brought in has to be connected here first. The kiosk scans its contents, and only after that can anything go on to the plant machines. TXOne Safe Port is a kiosk of this kind: it scans the connected media with a malware scanner, then displays and logs the result.
Where to put it
The kiosk should not be part of the OT network. If someone plugs an infected device into it, the malware must not be able to reach the controllers from there. The scanner's signatures do need updating, though, so the kiosk sits either on the IT network or in the industrial DMZ, where it receives updates through a controlled path. A kiosk that has not been updated for months only recognizes old malware, and the user still sees a clean result.
What it should check
- Every file, including the unpacked contents of compressed archives. A password-protected archive cannot be scanned, so it is best to reject it outright.
- The file type, regardless of the extension. A renamed executable is still an executable.
- The list of allowed file types. If maintenance only needs program files, PDFs, and CSVs, a macro-enabled Office document has no business in the plant.
A common setup is for the kiosk to copy the files that passed the scan onto a designated plant-owned drive, which the maintenance technician then takes to the machine.
A portable scanning device for machines off the network
You also need to know whether an isolated HMI or a supplier's laptop is clean. These machines cannot be plugged into the kiosk, and often no software may be installed on them either.
That is what a portable scanning device is for. TXOne Portable Inspector is a device in a USB form factor. Connected to the Windows machine being checked, it runs a malware scan without installing anything, collects data about the machine along the way, such as the operating system version and the installed software, and stores the scan results. It leaves no running service on the machine after the scan.
When it is used
- To check a supplier's laptop before it touches any plant machine or network port.
- For regular scans of isolated machines, for example every quarter or at every planned shutdown.
- As the first check when an infection is suspected and it is not yet clear which machine is affected.
What to watch for
A scan is a snapshot: it shows what was on the machine at the time of the scan. Here too, detection depends on how current the signatures are, so the portable device also needs regular updates on a designated, controlled computer. Plugging in a USB device is itself an intervention in the control system, so it is worth agreeing on it with the equipment supplier in advance and, if there is a spare machine with the same configuration, trying it there first.
Regular scanning does not replace protection running on the machine. Where possible, allowlist-based protection stops an unknown program brought in from starting in the first place.
A media intake procedure for employees and suppliers
If a supplier can also get in through the back entrance with a USB drive, or a shift supervisor waives the scan during an urgent fault, an uncontrolled path to the plant machines remains alongside the kiosk. The procedure therefore sets out what may go in, who may bring it in, and what happens when an exception is made.
Among its system requirements, the IEC 62443-3-3 standard has a separate requirement for controlling the use of portable and mobile devices, and the NIST SP 800-82 guide to OT security also covers removable media. The IEC 62443 zones and conduits model is explained in a separate article. A practical procedure typically consists of these points:
- Only issued, registered media may be connected to plant machines. Personal and supplier USB drives stay at the kiosk.
- The supplier announces in advance what they are bringing: which file, which version, for which machine. That way the gatehouse can see when something arrives that was not announced.
- A scan is mandatory every time media comes in, even if the same technician already went through it yesterday.
- Service laptops are scanned with the portable device on entry and may connect to the plant network only at a designated point. Where possible, the plant's own service laptop, kept for this purpose, is used instead.
- Data taken out is recorded as well: recipes and production data may not leave the plant without a record either.
- It is written down who decides on exceptions, and that should be someone who can be reached on the night shift too.
The procedure also has to appear in the supplier contract, otherwise the technician first runs into it at the gatehouse. For the gatehouse staff and the maintenance team, a short, practical training session is enough: how the kiosk works and what to do when it shows a red result.
What happens to an infected or unknown file
Infected file
If the kiosk finds malware, the media may not go any further, the file is quarantined, and the case has to be handled as an incident. The infection came from somewhere: if the supplier's laptop is infected, it may have carried the malware elsewhere too, so the supplier must be notified as well. If the file is needed for the job, it has to be obtained again from a clean source, such as the vendor's download portal, and checked against the hash value the vendor publishes.
Unknown file
A malware scanner finding nothing does not yet mean the file is safe. An executable of a type that is not allowed, or of unknown origin, should not go in just because the scan came back clean. In that case you can check whether it carries a valid digital signature from the vendor, or run the file in a sandbox, where its behavior can be observed. After that, the person the procedure designates for exceptions can approve bringing it in.
False positives
Malware scanners sometimes flag the installers and utilities of control software as suspicious. When that happens, it is tempting for someone to simply override the result. An override should be made by hash, as a documented exception. The next time, the same file then goes through under the same decision, while a modified version of it does not.
Logging and traceability
When an infection shows up in the plant, one of the first questions is what came in over the past few weeks, who brought it, and onto which machine. You can only answer that if the scans from the kiosk and the portable device have been kept and the log holds enough data. For each entry, it is worth recording:
- the time, plus the name and company of the person bringing it in,
- the media identifier: its own asset tag and, if the device reports them, its manufacturer and serial number,
- the names and hash values of the files,
- the scan result, with the malware scanner and signature versions,
- the target machine the file went to.
The hash is also useful after the fact. If a file turns out weeks later to have contained malware, the hash lets you trace who brought it in, when, and which controller it ended up on.
The kiosk's local log is not enough on its own, because a hardware failure or a deliberate deletion takes it with it. Scan results should be forwarded to a central log collector or a SIEM, and the logs of the portable devices should be read out regularly and loaded into the same place.
The log also has to be compared with the maintenance records from time to time. If a PLC program change was made on a given day but there was no scan at the kiosk that day, the file got in around the kiosk. A discrepancy like that needs the same investigation as a malware detection.
Related service: Media inspection station →