Non-intrusive scanners and controlled exploit, primary focus on operational continuity.
We deliver a complete snapshot of your OT security posture by evaluating existing controls, identifying gaps, and recommending targeted mitigations. Our outcome-focused approach ensures every recommendation drives real risk reduction.
Leveraging industry best practices (ISO/IEC 62443, ISO/IEC 27001, NIST and ISF) we tailor each assessment to your environment. Automated scanning, manual testing and expert analysis combine to surface all vulnerabilities.
Comprehensive baseline of your current OT security posture
Roadmap to reduce attack surface and risk in the short, mid and long term
Gap analysis across People, Process & Technology
Data-driven support for cybersecurity investment decisions
Non-intrusive methods to preserve production uptime
Rapid execution, complete assessment in as little as 1–2 weeks
Set technical and organizational boundaries.
Standards-aligned, OT-specific evaluation.
Executive and technical documentation.
This service is particularly valuable in the sectors below, due to their specific regulations, asset base and threat models.
In industrial environments vulnerability assessment does not mean scanning. An active scanner can knock over a controller, so identification happens passively and prioritisation follows reachability and business impact.
Passive discovery records vendor, model and exact firmware version. Vulnerability matching depends on this: without versions there are no meaningful findings.
Versions are matched against several sources: vendor bulletins, ICS-CERT advisories, NVD and the CISA KEV catalogue. The last of these shows what is actually being exploited.
CVSS alone misleads. We look at whether the device is reachable by an attacker, which process it belongs to, and whether compensating controls surround it.
What can be patched gets a schedule for the downtime window. What cannot gets compensating controls: segmentation, virtual patching, access restriction. What gets neither receives documented risk acceptance.
An industrial environment can produce hundreds of findings. A manageable list emerges when context is weighed alongside the score.
| Factor | What we examine | Effect on priority |
|---|---|---|
| Active exploitation | Presence in the CISA KEV list | Immediate priority, regardless of CVSS |
| Reachability | From which zone the device is reachable | Isolated zone: orders of magnitude lower |
| Likelihood of exploitation | EPSS score | Below 0.01 essentially negligible |
| Process criticality | What happens if this device stops | SIS and key controllers: escalated |
| Compensating control | Is there an IPS or segmentation in front | Virtual patching: priority can be lowered |
| Patchability | Is there a vendor fix, when is downtime | Unpatchable: control-based treatment |
No, at least not in the usual sense. A general network vulnerability scanner can knock over an older PLC by sending it unexpected packets, so we do not use one in industrial environments. Version identification happens passively from traffic analysis. Where active verification is unavoidable, we perform it only in a lab or during planned downtime on identical spare hardware, agreed in advance.
This is the baseline situation in industrial environments, not the exception. Three answers exist. First, network-level virtual patching: the industrial IPS recognises and blocks traffic targeting the vulnerability while the device stays untouched. Second, tighter segmentation so the vulnerable device is reachable only from where it must be. Third, documented risk acceptance, which is a legitimate answer when somebody makes and signs the decision.
Comprehensively once a year, plus after any significant change: new equipment, network redesign, vendor firmware update. Beyond that it is worth reviewing quarterly whether new vulnerabilities have appeared for existing devices, because the estate may not change but the threat picture does. That review is no longer field work, just comparing the inventory against the databases.
A vulnerability assessment shows what known flaws exist and how urgent each is. A penetration test shows what an attacker actually achieves with them. In OT the gap between the two is large, because segmentation renders many theoretically severe vulnerabilities practically unreachable. The recommended order: assessment first, then a test after segmentation to verify that the zone boundaries genuinely hold.
Yes. NIS2 measure area five (security in acquisition, development and maintenance) and the IEC 62443-2-3 patch management requirement both ask for the process, not for zero vulnerabilities. A documented assessment, prioritisation and risk acceptance decision is an adequate answer. On request we provide a compliance extract with the report.