The first 24 hours after a cyber incident

Hour by hour: what to do and what not to do from discovery to regulatory notification, and why preserving evidence is the most important early decision.

Topic
IT security
Author
ARLITECH expert team
Published
Updated

The first hours of an incident decide far more of how the whole case ends than their share of the timeline would suggest. The reason is not that the attacker can still be stopped then, since they have usually been inside for weeks. Those hours do, however, settle the questions that cannot be undone later: whether the evidence survives, whether you will ever find out how they got in, and whether you meet the statutory deadlines.

Below we go through it in order.

  1. Hours 0-1 Discovery and first decisions
  2. Hours 1-4 Scope and containment
  3. Hours 4-12 Evidence and outside help
  4. Hours 12-24 Notification obligations
Phases of the first 24 hours

Hours 0-1: discovery and first decisions

What to do right away:

Write down the time and what it was that brought the incident to light. This is the first line of the incident record, and both the investigators and the authorities will ask for it later.

Bring together a small group, not the whole IT department: one decision-maker, one system administrator, one person responsible for communications. A crowded “war room” tends to slow things down in the first hours.

What you must not do:

Do not switch the machines off. This is the most common mistake, and the most expensive one. Traces held in memory (running processes, network connections, sometimes the encryption key itself) are lost for good at shutdown. You can disconnect a machine from the network, but you must not cut its power.

Do not start reinstalling. The “let's restore it quickly and move on” reflex is understandable, but if it overwrites the evidence, you will never learn the entry point. And if you never find out how they got in, they will come back the same way.

Do not communicate over the compromised channel. If email or chat may be affected, the attacker is reading your response planning. Switch to a separate channel (phone, an app running on a separate device).

Hours 1-4: scope and containment

Now you have to decide how far the damage reaches and what can be taken offline safely.

Scope assessment. How many systems are affected? Which accounts have been compromised? Are there signs of data exfiltration (heavy outbound traffic to an unknown destination)? The state of the domain controllers and the backup infrastructure is a separate question.

Proportionate containment. Disconnecting is not the default response. In IT environments, segments can be isolated fairly quickly. In industrial environments this can stop production or put process safety at risk, so the decision has to be made together with plant management, against criteria defined in advance. We do not touch safety systems (SIS) in the name of incident response.

Credentials. If domain compromise is suspected, changing the passwords of key accounts is urgent. At the same time, a rushed password change made too early can tip the attacker off that they have been spotted. It is a judgment call, and it is usually best made together with the outside expert you bring in.

Take memory and disk images of the key systems before you change anything on them. If you do not have the capacity in-house, at least copy the logs to separate storage that the attacker cannot reach.

Hours 4-12: evidence and outside help

Log collection. Firewall, domain controller, endpoint protection, VPN, email, cloud services. Copy these out right away: logs usually rotate on short retention periods, and the part that matters may be exactly what gets lost.

Bringing in an outside expert. If you have no in-house incident response capacity, this is the point where you have to decide. The later you call for help, the less evidence is left.

Insurance. If you have cyber insurance, the insurer often specifies which experts you may bring in. Check this in the first hours, not in the second week.

Legal and communications preparation. Who is allowed to speak publicly? What do you tell clients if they ask? Staying silent is also a decision, and it should be a conscious one.

Hours 12-24: notification obligations

This is where the statutory deadlines start to run out.

  1. Hour 0 The moment of suspicion The clock starts when the incident is first suspected, not when the investigation is complete.
  2. Within 24 hours Early warning It is enough to state that a significant incident is suspected, whether it was presumably caused by an unlawful act, and whether it may have a cross-border impact.
  3. Within 72 hours Incident notification
  4. Within 1 month Final report
Other notifications
GDPR personal data breach: 72 hours
If personal data is affected and the breach poses a risk.
Cyber insurance: per the policy, often 24‑48 hours
If you are insured.
Client contracts: per the contract
Often 24 hours; worth reviewing.
NIS2 incident notification deadlines If the organization falls within the scope of NIS2 and the incident is significant.

The NIS2 early warning asks for less than many people assume. A full analysis is not required.

The most common mistake is to hold off in the hope of “first clearing up what happened.”

What to prepare in advance

The first 24 hours only go well if nobody has to work out what to do on the spot. Four things are worth preparing in advance, and each one takes half a day:

1. Contact list. Who the decision-maker is, who handles legal, who handles communications, and how to reach the outside expert and the insurer. Keep a printed copy too, because the systems may be unavailable.

2. Notification templates. A fill-in skeleton for the NIS2 early warning and for the GDPR notification. When an incident starts on a weekend, this saves hours.

3. Escalation criteria. At what point does an incident count as “significant”? Who can decide on a shutdown? In an OT environment, who approves isolating a segment?

4. Evidence preservation instructions. A single A4 page on what must not be done. The on-call system administrator will be reading it at three in the morning, so keep it short.

Tabletop exercise

It is worth running through the plan every six months. A two-hour tabletop exercise, in which management and IT work through a scenario together, is worth more than any document. The exercise always brings the same gaps to light: someone's phone number is missing, nobody knows who makes the call, and it turns out that restoring from backup takes three times as long as the business assumed.

We covered that last point in detail in our article on backup strategy, and we cover the ransomware-specific steps on the ransomware protection page.

If you want to build or test your incident response capability, our incident response retainer and OT incident response protocol services both cover this.

Contact

Ready to secure your critical systems?

Our experts will assess where your security stands and build a roadmap that fits your organization.

ARLITECH's office in Gödöllő

Visit us

You are welcome to visit our Gödöllő office in person.

Address
Centrum Office Building, 2100 Gödöllő, Dózsa György út 13, 3rd floor, office 309
Office hours
Mon–Fri, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Get directions (opens in a new tab)