Once an attacker is inside the network, the first goal is domain administrator rights; stealing data can wait. Everything else follows from there: deleting backups, lateral movement, mass encryption. That is why an attack hinges on Active Directory.
Below we go through the paths attackers take to get there, and what you can do about each one.
1. Kerberoasting
What the attacker does. Any domain user can request a service ticket (TGS) for an account that has an SPN. The ticket is encrypted with the service account's password hash, so it can be cracked offline. No elevated rights are needed, and the request on its own looks like normal operation.
Why it works. Service account passwords are often short, based on dictionary words, and have not been changed in years.
What you can do:
- Give accounts with an SPN a random password of at least 25 characters. At that length, offline cracking is practically hopeless.
- Where possible, use a gMSA (group Managed Service Account): AD manages the password and rotates it automatically.
- Check which accounts have an SPN they do not need, and never give one to an account with domain admin rights.
- Alert on an unusually high number of TGS requests from a single account, especially with RC4 encryption.
2. AS-REP roasting
What the attacker does. If Kerberos pre-authentication is disabled on an account, anyone can request an AS-REP response for it, and that can also be cracked offline. This does not even require authenticated access.
What you can do. Find the accounts with the DONT_REQ_PREAUTH setting and turn pre-authentication back on. This is typically a handful of legacy accounts, and the fix takes minutes. If it cannot be turned back on for some reason, a long random password is the answer there too.
3. Password spraying
What the attacker does. They try one or two common passwords against many accounts. Trying many passwords against one account would trigger a lockout. Patterns like Spring2026! or the company name plus a year hit surprisingly often.
What you can do:
- Banned password list: the company name, product names, the seasons, and passwords that are common locally. A length requirement alone does not protect against this.
- MFA on every externally reachable service. This attack starts at the perimeter, typically on webmail or the VPN.
- Alert on failed sign-ins across many accounts within a short time from a single source IP.
- Disable legacy authentication protocols, because MFA does not protect them.
4. ACL and privilege abuse
What the attacker does. Over the years, the AD permission structure becomes impossible to follow. In that situation the attacker looks for a privilege chain instead of a vulnerability: which account can write to a group that is a member of another group, which in turn has password reset rights over an admin.
A graph tool (BloodHound) can map this chain in minutes, and most domains have such a path.
What you can do:
- Map it yourself. Use the same tool an attacker would use. That is the fastest way to find the unintended paths.
- Regular access reviews, with particular attention to nested group memberships.
- Check
AdminSDHolderand the membership of the protected groups.
5. Credentials in memory
What the attacker does. With administrator rights on a machine, they can read the tickets and hashes of signed-in users from memory. If a domain admin ever signed in to that machine, the attacker gets their rights.
What you can do:
- Turn on Credential Guard on supported systems.
- Tiered admin model: domain admin accounts may sign in to domain controllers only, never to a workstation or a general member server.
- LAPS: a unique, automatically rotated local admin password on every machine. Without it, one shared local password gives access to the whole fleet.
- RDP Restricted Admin mode, so that remote sign-in leaves no credentials on the target machine.
6. Delegation misconfigurations
What the attacker does. Kerberos delegation lets a service act on behalf of a user. With unconstrained delegation, the service receives the user's full ticket, so it can impersonate anyone who connects to it.
What you can do. Find the machines and accounts configured for unconstrained delegation and switch them to constrained or resource-based delegation. Outside the domain controllers, unconstrained delegation has no place. This is typically a handful of legacy systems, and finding them takes a single query.
7. Certificate Services (ADCS) template flaws
What the attacker does. If a certificate template lets the requester supply the subject (SAN), anyone can request a certificate that identifies a domain administrator. With it, they can authenticate directly as that admin, without a password.
What you can do. Review your certificate templates: which ones allow an arbitrary SAN, which have no approval requirement, and which grant enrollment rights too broadly. This class of attack is relatively new, so many environments have never been checked for it.
8. Legacy protocols
What the attacker does. NTLMv1, SMBv1, and LLMNR/NBT-NS name resolution are all protocols that leak credentials or allow them to be relayed. A device placed on the network passively collects hashes whenever machines send name resolution requests.
What you can do:
- Disable LLMNR and NBT-NS through Group Policy. It takes a few clicks and ends passive hash collection.
- Enforce SMB signing so that relaying does not work.
- Block NTLMv1 and LM, and restrict NTLM use where you can.
Where to start
If you can pick only one thing, start with discovery: run an AD assessment with the same tools an attacker would use. The result is typically a handful of concrete paths you can fix, rather than hundreds of theoretical flaws.
After that, this order works well:
- Quick fixes: disable LLMNR, fix the AS-REP roastable accounts, remove unconstrained delegation. A matter of days.
- Passwords: long passwords or gMSA for service accounts, a LAPS rollout, a banned password list.
- Tiered admin model: the biggest job, but it gives the most lasting protection.
- Monitoring: every attack above leaves traces, as long as logs are collected and someone is watching them.
We covered the fourth point in our article on SIEM deployment, and stronger authentication in the one on MFA types. If you want to find out where you stand, our IT security services include an AD assessment.